Hernandez v. Tokai Corp.,
2 S.W.2d 251 (Tex. 1999) (certified question from
U.S. Fifth Circuit) (9-0, by Hecht);
Kroger Co. v. Robins,
5 S.W.3d 221 (Tex. 1999) (per curiam).

In both of these cases, a child was severely burned by a fire started by a child playing with a cigarette lighter that was not child resistant. The parents sued the manufacturer, distributor and/or seller of the lighters, claiming the lighters were “defective” because they were not child resistant. The Supreme Court rejected the defendants argument that there was no duty to make a product child resistant if it is intended only for adult use.

Kroger Co. v. Keng,
43 TEX. SUP. CT. J. 738 (Tex. 2000)
(9-0, by Hankinson).

In this case, the Court held that a company that does not subscribe to workers’ compensation insurance is not entitled to a jury question regarding its employee’s alleged comparative responsibility for his or her injuries. The decision protects employees because it discourages employers from opting out of the workers’ compensation insurance system and then attempting to raise comparative responsibility as a defense to providing compensation for on-the-job injuries.

Dubai Petroleum Co. v. Kazi,
12 S.W.2d 71 (Tex. 2000) (8-0, by Phillips;
Enoch did not participate).

Kazi, a citizen of India, was killed while working on an oil rig off the coast of the United Arab Emirates. His survivors, all citizens of India, brought a wrongful death action in Harris County district court. At the time, the relevant statute provided that suit could be brought in Texas if the foreign country of which the injured person was a citizen had “equal treaty rights” with the United States. The trial court dismissed on the ground that India does not have “equal treaty rights” with the United States. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs satisfied their initial burden of showing “equal treaty rights” and the case should not have been dismissed.

National Liability and Fire Ins. Co. v. Allen,
15 S.W.2d 525 (Tex. 2000) (7-2, by Baker; dissent by Owen).

In this workers’ compensation case, the insurer claimed that the injured employee did not notify the employer of the injury within the time required by the workers’ compensation statute. Citing Albertson’s and Benavidez, the Court holds that the employee’s notice was timely given.

Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Casteel,
43 TEX. SUP. CT. J. 348 (Tex. 2000) (9-0, by Abbott).

A policy-holder sued an insurance company and its agent for misrepresentations in regard to the sale of a “vanishing premium” insurance policy. The agent cross-claimed against the insurance company, essentially saying that the company lied to him about the policy. The Court held that the agent was a “person” with standing to bring a cause of action under the Insurance Code for unfair competition and unfair insurance practices. The ruling gives insurance agents the opportunity to pursue claims against their own insurance company that have been traditionally reserved for policyholders or beneficiaries of policies.

Continental Casualty Ins. Co. v. Functional Restoration Assoc.,
43 TEX. SUP. CT. J. 573 (Tex. 2000) (5-4, by Abbott; dissents by Phillips and Owen).

The Court held that there is no statutory right by which an insurer can obtain judicial review of a medical benefits decision by the Texas Worker’s Compensation Commission’s Hearings Division. This decision may prevent insurers from tying up medical decisions regarding injured workers, and possibly the medical treatment that the workers need, in the court system.

Borneman v. Steak & Ale of Texas, Inc.,
43 TEX. SUP. CT. J. 593 (Tex. 2000) (per curiam).

In this dram shop case, the court of appeals reversed and rendered judgment for the defendant on the ground that there was error in the question submitted to the jury. The Supreme Court agreed that there was error in the original trial but reversed, holding that the plaintiff should have the opportunity for a new trial, not a judgment in favor of the defendant.

Stevens v. National Education Centers, Inc.,
11 S.W.3d 185 (Tex. 2000) (per curiam).

Whether the plaintiff suffered mental anguish as a result of the defendant’s conduct was incorrectly submitted to the jury. Nonetheless, the Court holds that the judgment must stand because the defendant did not request the appropriate relief on appeal.

Hughes Wood Products, Inc. v. Wagner,
43 TEX. SUP. CT. J. 595 (Tex. 2000) (9-0, by O’Neill).

The plaintiff was injured in Louisiana but brought suit in Texas. The defendants argued that the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Act’s exclusive remedy provision barred the plaintiff’s Texas action. The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants, but the court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals, holding that the defendants failed to show that they were immune from suit under Louisiana law.

Chilkewitz v. Hyson,
43 TEX. SUP. CT. J. 52 (Tex. 1999) (8-0, by Owen;
Hankinson did not participate).

In this case, the plaintiff accidentally sued the defendant personally, rather than the defendant’s physician’s association. The defendant argued that the plaintiff did not toll the statute of limitations against the professional association by filing suit against the physician personally. The court holds that the proper party is sued when that party is sued in either its assumed or common name.

Read v. Scott Fetzer Co.,
990 S.W.2d 732 (Tex. 1998) (6-3, by Gonzalez;
dissents by Hecht and Abbott).

Customer who was raped by door-to-door vacuum cleaner salesman sued manufacturer and distributor, who operated as an independent contractor. Court held that the manufacturer was liable in negligence because it exercised control over the distributor by requiring in-home demonstrations and sales.

Albertson’s Inc. v. Sinclair
985 S.W.2d 958 (Tex. 1999) (per curiam) and
Benavidez v. Travlers Indemnity Co.,
985 S.W.2d 958 (Tex. 1999) (per curiam).

In these two cases, workers who were injured on the job appealed unfavorable rulings of the Workers’ Compensation Commission Appeals Panel, but there was a question whether they timely served documents on the Appeals Panel. Construing the act liberally in favor of the injured workers, the Court held that injured workers will not be denied judicial review of decisions rendered by the Appeals Panel on the basis of failure to timely file documents with the Appeals Panel, thus assuring a review on the merits.

Mid-Century Ins. Co. v. Lindsey,
997 S.W.2d 153 (Tex. 1999) (6-3, by Hecht; dissent by Enoch).

A child crawling through the back window of a pickup caused a shotgun in the gun rack of pickup to discharge, injuring a person sitting in a nearby car. The Court held that the injured person could collect under his uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage because the injury arose from “an accident” “aris[ing] out of” the “use” of the pickup.

Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Martinez,
977 S.W.2d 328 (Tex. 1998) (5-4, by Phillips; dissent by Hecht).

Martinez was injured when 16” tire he mounted on 16.5” rim exploded during inflation. Tire carried a warning against mounting it on 16.5” rim. Nonetheless, the Court found that the tire manufacturer could be liable in strict products liability because it knew of a safer alternative product design. The mere fact that a product bears an adequate warning does not conclusively establish that the product is not defective.

Burrow v. Arce,
997 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. 1999) (9-0, by Hecht, J.).

A lawyer for workers injured in chemical plant explosion settled litigation allegedly without full consent of his clients. The Court holds that an attorney who breaches his fiduciary duty to his client may be required to forfeit all or part of his fee, irrespective of whether the breach caused the client actual damages.

GTE Southwest, Inc. v. Bruce,
998 S.W.2d 605 (Tex. 1999) (9-0, by Abbott).

A GTE supervisory employee was abusive to his subordinates. The subordinates sued GTE directly for intentional infliction of emotional distress because it had not prevented the supervisor’s acts. The Court held that GTE was liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on the wrongful acts of its supervisor. The ruling protects employees from harassing and threatening conduct by their supervisors because it puts corporations on notice that they must either take action against abusive supervisors, or be held accountable for the consequences of the supervisor’s behavior.

NME Hospital, Inc. v. Rennels,
994 S.W.2d 142 (Tex. 1999) (9-0, by Hankinson).

Rennels, a doctor, worked as a pathologist for Sierra. Sierra’s primary client was NME and NME exercised significant control over Sierra’s operations. Rennels overheard a conversation between an NME executive and a Sierra shareholder in which the NME executive said Rennels should not become a Sierra shareholder. Rennels sued NME under the unlawful employment practices provisions of the Texas Labor Code even though she was not an employee of NME. The Court held that the act may apply even absent a direct employer-employee relationship.

Texas Farmers Ins. Co. v. Murphy,
996 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. 1999) (6-1-2, by Gonzales;
concurrence by Hecht; dissent by Enoch).

The husband set a couple’s house on fire. The innocent wife sought to recover her community property share of the insurance proceeds. The Court held that an innocent spouse may recover insurance proceeds when the other spouse has intentionally destroyed covered community property. This decision prevents imputing guilt to an innocent spouse for the wrongdoing of his or her spouse, and protects the contract rights of the innocent spouse to receive the property protection that he or she contracted for with an insurance company.

Toranto v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Texas, Inc.,
993 S.W.2d 648 (Tex. 1999) (per curiam).

Dr. Toranto performed surgery on a patient. Before surgery, the patient assigned her insurance benefits to Toranto. The patient’s insurance was through the State of Texas and Blue Cross administered the plan. The plan had an anti-assignment provision and, based on that provision, Blue Cross refused to approve payment to Toranto. The Court held that the anti-assignment provision violated the Texas Insurance Code and that the patient could assign her right to insurance proceeds to the doctor.

McCamish, Martin, Brown & Loeffler v. F.E. Appling Interest,
991 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1999) (9-0, by Hankinson).

Appling sued VSA, who was represented by the McCamish law firm. As part of a settlement of the suit, McCamish assured Appling that the settlement complied with a federal statute. It did not. Appling then sued McCamish. The Court held that McCamish could be liable to Appling in negligence even though there was no privity of contract between them.